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ARTICLES
ITEM VETO WITHOUT A GLOBAL SPENDING
LIMIT: LOCKING THE TREASURY
AFTER THE DOLLARS HAVE FLED
AARON WILDAVSKY*
The budgetary process frequently shapes public policy.
Whether current events lead to maintaining the existing
budgetary process or to radically changing the way we allo-
cate resources, therefore, may determine the future course of
public policy. Two completely opposite changes in the budg-
etary process are currently being debated: an item veto and a
global spending limit. The item veto would allow presidents
to veto discrete parts of single bills. It would give presidents
more formal power on the supposition that they would use it
to lower spending. A global spending limit, however, would
fix the total amount that could be spent in a given year by
restricting outlays to the prior year's amount, plus or minus
the proportionate increase or decrease in the GNP. This
would alter the rules of the budgetary game from one of ad-
ding proposals together to one of subtracting: more for some
programs would result in less for others. Thirty-two states
have already passed resolutions calling for a constitutional
convention on a balanced budget-spending limit amend-
ment;' within a few months the magic number of 34 (two-
thirds of the states) may be reached, and the budgetary pro-
cess will be taken out of congressional hands.
The item veto, although superficially attractive, would
not effectively cut spending; instead, it would further weaken
the budgetary process. Empowering presidents to strike down
congressional spending they believe excessive is merely a re-
active budget control, which would make Congress more irre-
sponsible rather than less, encourage log-rolling and drasti-
cally alter the separation of powers.
Establishing a global spending limit, on the other hand,
* Professor of Political Science and Public Policy and Member, Sur-
vey Research Center, University of California, Berkeley.
1. See Rackoff, The Monster Approaching the Capital: The Effort to Write
Economic Policy into the United States Constitution, 15 AKRON L. REv. 733
(1982).
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would put the responsibility to control spending in the hands
of the legislators. If expenditures could not increase faster
than the growth of the gross national product, then big in-
creases in some programs would require decreases in others.
Incentives would be created for spenders to limit each other,
and it would become worthwhile to sacrifice because every-
one else would have to stay within the limits.
In what follows, I outline the weaknesses in the item veto
and analyze the states' experience with it. In conclusion, I
propose a global spending limit as an anticipatory budget
mechanism that would effectively control spending at its
source, the legislature, and would avert the problems that the
item veto would create.
1. A LITTLE TOOL FOR A BIG JOB: THE LINE-ITEM VETO
As the 1984 election campaign demonstrated, most
Republicans, facing the unpleasant task of explaining away
historically unprecedented deficits, being unwilling to talk of
raising taxes and unable to reduce domestic spending, under-
standably spoke favorably of the line-item veto. So long as
most Democrats resisted, blame for continuing deficits could
be placed on them. Focusing entirely on the immediate fu-
ture, Republicans may well indulge themselves in fantasies of
their leader cutting and slashing, slashing and cutting, until
big government is vetoed out root and branch. However that
is all it is, a fantasy.
It does not take much imagination to realize that presi-
dents other than Ronald Reagan may occupy the White
House. Would someone with different economic priorities
use the item veto to increase defense and decrease domestic
spending or might it be the other way around? Might a presi-
dent interested in increasing domestic spending hold defense
spending ransom to achieve that purpose? Whereas spending
limits bind presidents no matter who they are or what their
spending proclivities, the effectiveness of the item veto in re-
ducing overall spending depends on a particular personality
and political persuasion.
Granting proponents of the item veto the best of their
possible worlds, their President in the White House ready to
throttle the expenditure machine, does not rescue the item
veto from the charge of inappropriateness. President Reagan
does not wish to cut defense, which amounts to around 28
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percent of the budget.' He has, without the item veto, helped
reduce means-tested entitlements; 3 he has been unable or un-
willing to cut the big-ticket universal entitlements, especially
social security,4 because they have widespread support. To-
gether these social welfare programs amount to about 47 per-
cent of the budget.5 Allowing approximately 12 percent for
interest on the national debt," only a small 13 percent de-
voted to general government would be subject to the item
veto.
But even much of the 13 percent allocated to govern-
ment will prove precarious to the item veto. First, there is
misadventure. By attempting to outguess markets (they were
supposed to go "this-a-way" and instead they went "that-a-
way"), or by engaging in economic fine tuning (trying to ad-
just supply and demand ever so slightly but, as usual, it ended
up adjusting them), the government has paid billions of dol-
lars more in agricultural subsidies7 than the Democrats would
have dared to do for fear of being branded profligate.
Second, there is politics. Perhaps the President's people
think he will use the item veto to eliminate or reduce politi-
cally important expenditures on which there has long been a
negative professional consensus. I refer to agricultural8 and
maritime subsidies,9 sub-market prices for grazing rights on
federal land,10 water for irrigation in the west,1 all sorts of
river and harbor projects,12 and the like. Before I believe
that presidents will kill these "sacred cows" with an item
veto, I want to see these same presidents do something al-
ready in their power: appoint officials who will oppose these
programs. Whether an item veto would be effective, assum-
ing a congressional initiative to restore funding, is problemat-
ical but doubtful. In any event, although tempting targets
2. See EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, OFF. OF MGMT. AND BUDGET IN
BRIEF, F.Y. 1984, at 23 (1983).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, OFF. OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, SPECIAL
ANALYSIS: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOV'T., FY 1984, at E-I 1 (1983).
7. Collins & O'Shea, Stockman: Subsidies Bloat Budget, Chicago Trib-
une, Feb. 6, 1985 at 1, 9.
8. See 130 CONG. REC. E1210 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1984), and 130
CONG. REC. S1097-99 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1984).
9. See 129 CONG. REC. S10023-26 (daily ed. July 14, 1983).
10. See 129 CONG. REC. H4555-56 (daily ed. June 28, 1983).
11. See 130 CONG. REC. H1738-58 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1984).
12. See 130 CONG. REc. 53479-80 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1984).
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could be eliminated, cuts in thirteen percent of the federal
budget, which has already been severely pruned, will not
make a big difference.
Third, there is misconception. The item veto does not
address the widespread will to spend. Rather it conveys the
image of presidents valiantly trying to stem the tide of spend-
ing but, for want of this one weapon, being overwhelmed by
hordes of congressional spenders. There is no truth in this.
Presidents have been in the forefront of spending. In this re-
spect, think not only of Democrat Lyndon Johnson but of Re-
publican Richard Nixon, in whose administration, in service
of his vaunted flexibility, huge increases in social security,13
loan guarantees," and housing expenditures15 took place.
More than this micro-error about presidents, however,
macro-mistakes about political systems in general and Ameri-
can politics in particular lie behind this misconception about
the item veto. First the general, then the particular.
The general case against the sufficiency of the item veto
is overwhelming. Line up the world leaders in public expen-
diture as a proportion of GNP among democracies: in all of
them, cabinets have the power to determine the entire spend-
ing budget, item by item, line by line. 6 These governments
do not need an item veto because nothing gets into the
budget without their approval. Nonetheless their budgets
grow. Part of the reason (in some but not all these spending
leaders) is that they have coalition governments in which the
cost of consent is side payments to partners which increase
the size of the budget. To the extent that the United States
shares this characteristic of divided government, either be-
cause the presidency and all or part of Congress are held by
different parties or because, though ostensibly of the same
party, their policy preferences differ, there is no reason to
believe the item veto will do what total formal control of the
budget cannot. Insofar as governments controlled by a single
party, such as Sweden and Norway,1 7 are concerned, even
13. See Table 2, Budget Receipts by Source and Outlays by Function 1971-
1981, in ExEc. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, OFF. OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, THE U.S.
BUDGET IN BRIEF, F.Y. 1981, at 71 (1980).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See A. WILDAVSKY, BUDGETING: A COMPARATIVE THEORY OF BUDG-
ETARY PROCESSES (1975).
17. Tarschys, Curbing Public Expenditures: A Survey of Current Trends,
paper prepared for the Joint Activity on Public Management Improvement
of the OECD (Technical Co.-Operation Service), April 1982.
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unity of command is not equal to the task.
It is not that most of these governments do not have pe-
riodic budget cutting drives but that these campaigns are
never successful. 8 Hence the essential nature of the problem
is clarified: lack of governmental desire and/or self-control.
Governments must (a) want to reduce spending, and (b) have
an effective technology for doing so.
Considering the United States by itself, there is a good
chance that the item veto, instead of merely being limited or
ineffective, would be positively counterproductive. Under-
standing why this might happen requires a brief excursion
into the separation of powers. In the United States, the legis-
lative function is shared between Congress and the President.
Presidents may veto proposed legislation 9 and Congress may
pass it into law by a two-thirds vote.20 With the item veto,
what is not stated, because it is taken for granted, is that Con-
gress may act and not act, in other words, pass a law and not
take responsibility for it. Then the branches of government
really would not be separated, one responsible within its
sphere, cooperating when possible, conflicting when neces-
sary, joined together. For then, with an item veto, a president
could pick and choose among parts of legislation, fashioning
a law essentially his own.
Voting on the understanding that a bill may become a
law is not the same as voting with the expectation that part of
the proposal will be taken out even though the rest will re-
main. Acting under the first expectation, a legislator has to
act as if the bill might become a law for which he or she
would be responsible. Acting under the second expectation, a
legislator may put in provisions believing that the President
has to take responsibility either by vetoing or signing the leg-
islation. Placing a suggested menu before the ultimate de-
cider, knowing he can pick and choose, is not the same as
believing one is among the last decision makers. The respon-
sibility of the President has been clarified and strengthened
with the item veto: he is responsible for every part of an ap-
propriation or a law he does not veto. Whereas before he had
to judge whether to accept or reject the bill as a whole, he
would now pick and choose. Thus the old excuse that the
President did not want a particular appropriation but had to
accept it as part of a package would no longer be acceptable.
18. Id.
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, §7, c. 2.
20. Id.
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Instead of putting the onus on Congress to moderate its ex-
penditure proposals, the item veto, by giving presidents more
formal power, would place the onus on them.
By weakening its formal powers, the item veto would
make Congress more irresponsible. Congress, considered as
an institution, will have less reason than ever to consider the
collective consequences of its acts. If the President can veto
every item proposing spending of which he does not approve,
why not just throw in whatever is at hand, leaving it to the
President to get rid of the worst? Certainly, the efforts of a
congressman to argue with constituents that a particular item
is of low priority (every bit of spending helps somebody, or so
they think, or they would not want it) is gravely weakened by
the retort: let the President worry about that. With proposals
for spending becoming entirely a sign of good will, rather
than of collective responsibility, who will refuse? How helping
Congress avoid responsibility will reduce the growth of
spending is not self-evident.
In short, why risk upsetting the separation of powers for
losses that might be large while gains, if any, can only be
small? No one needs more policies that promise far more
than they can possibly deliver.
The item veto would certainly interfere with the normal
practice of logrolling in Congress. As a perceptive congress-
man put it,
Where Congress has appropriated for A and for B, Con-
gress means to say that it gives to each, conditioned upon
the gift to the other, and that it gives to neither unless it
gives to both . . . . The new veto power proposed would
give the President the right by the veto of one and the ap-
proval of the other, to exercise the function of giving to
one an appropriation independent of the other, when Con-
gress has only given it conditioned [on] the appropriation to
the other.2 1
If presidents could prevent bargains from being struck,
how would the characteristic congressional process of logroll-
ing be affected by the item veto? In logrolling, the legisla-
tion's passage depends on broadly spreading the benefits.
Suppose A and B agree to support each other to facilitate
passage of both their proposals. If A gets a project but B does
not because of the line item veto, then A's project is also in
jeopardy. At first blush, it appears that by withdrawing a log
21. H.R. Res. 1879, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886).
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(or logs) from the roll, there will be fewer agreements and
hence lower spending. Therefore, the item veto will reduce
spending.
Or will it? A linear argument leads to a one-way result.
Bringing in the effects of interaction suggests the opposite
conclusion that an item veto will actually increase logrolling.
Congress is a highly interactive and tightly linked system. Al-
ter one element and the others are also likely to change. Cur-
rently, congressmen have some incentive to create minimum
winning coalitions because giving too much to too many
might either have adverse overall effects or collapse of its
own weight. Consequently, bargains are renegotiated at
lower levels for each participant. But if Congress is faced
with the perpetual problem of overriding vetoes, the nature
of incentives will favor much larger (and, therefore, aggrega-,
tively more expensive) logrolls. The ultimate size of un-
repentant logrolling, the making of bargains that cumulate
into larger and larger aggregates, cannot be reduced by di-
minishing the number of small bargains because that only in-
creases the incentive to make bigger bargains.
What is necessary, rather, is to begin at the end: to start
by fixing the total permissible size of all bargains so that
whatever the roll of the expenditure logs, they must fit
within a pre-existing size. Logrolls would compete with each
other, thereby ending their upward spiral.
According to Lord Bryce, the item veto is one of those
practices that "is desired by enlightened opinion. ' ' 22 Presum-
ably, the item veto would help take the curse of divided au-
thority off the American separation of powers by lending it a
bit of the aura of the parliamentary system. The executive
would be strengthened (doubly so in Bryce's day, since at the
end of the 19th century the executive budget was not yet a
reality)23 and responsibility would be more clearly identified
and located in a centralized place. Indeed, the origin of the
item veto in the United States lies in the Constitution of the
Confederate States. 2' There and then, the rationale was
avowedly to bring in some of the advantages of the British
way. As we know, this hypothesis was never tested because
22. BRYCE, quoted in Comment, The Item Veto in the American Constitu-
tional System, 25 GEO. L.J. 113 (1936).
23. C. WEBBER & A. WILDAVSKY, Balanced Regimes, Balanced Budgets:
Why America Was So Different, in A HISTORY OF TAXATION AND EXPENDITURE
IN THE WESTERN WORLD, VII (forthcoming 1986).
24. CONFEDERATE CONST. art I, §7, cl. 1 (Permanent).
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the political system in which it was embedded was over-
thrown by force.
II. STATE EXPERIENCE WITH THE ITEM VETO
The argument for the item veto rests on a combination
of two factors: alleged budgetary cuts in states having the
item veto, together with a version of the marginal fallacy..
On the surface it does appear that under certain governors in
some states, such as Ronald Reagan in California,"6 the item
veto eliminated one or two percent of spending, which, if
cumulated over several years, adds up to significant reduc-
tions. I say "alleged" savings because it is well-known that
legislators pad their requests in anticipation of vetoes. Cumu-
lating cuts may be illusory if it is the same padded sums that
get eliminated. The marginal fallacy lies in the assumption
that whatever small proportion of the total that occupies
one's attention will make the critical difference in, say, reduc-
ing the deficit. The assumption that all others will be unaf-
fected is frequently fallacious. The claim for cumulative cuts
is reminiscent of the idea that if every Chinese person spent a
cent buying our products, we would be rich.
If the states are indeed a laboratory, no political scien-
tists in recent times have considered the consequences in the
43 states that employ a version of the item veto. There are
no comparative studies of the post-1960 experience. Did
these exist, it might be possible to say more about conditions
of effectiveness. Would the item veto have similar conse-
quences, for instance, in the presence or absence of a bal-
anced budget requirement? As things stand, nothing helpful
like this is possible. All I can do is bring in a few tidbits,
gleaned from studies of individual states, relevant to the ma-
jor arguments about the item veto.
Apparently, it is possible to interweave items so that they
are not separable, thereby nullifying the intent of the item
veto. At least, Roy D. Morey, writing about Arizona, says
that:
A major reason why the governor has not used the item
veto more frequently is that the legislature has deliberately
constructed appropriation bills in such a way as to stymie its
25. See Wildavsky, The Intelligent Citizen's Guide to the Abuses of Statis-
tics, 1 POL. & Soc. LIFE 825 (1963).
26. Caiden & Chapman, Constraint and Uncertainty: Budgeting in Cali-
fornia, 2 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 111 (1982).
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use. Those items which the legislature feels have questiona-
ble gubernatorial support are rearranged or lumped with
those items the governor is forced, either by conviction or
necessity, to approve."2 7
For this reason, he concludes "[the] device has proved to
be of little value to Arizona governors. '"28 It appears that the
item veto is more powerful in Pennsylvania where governors
use it a good deal. But this conclusion has to be modified by
interaction effects: "When a legislator, even though opposed
in principle to an appropriation, is reasonably certain that the
governor will slice it down to more moderate size," M. Nel-
son McGeary states in his study of Pennsylvania, "he is
tempted to bolster himself politically by voting large sums of
money to a popular cause."2 9 Some idea of the extent of irre-
sponsibility may be gained by noting that a bill to amend the
milk control law in 1940, which passed the state house by
200 to 0, was sustained over a veto, 115 yes to 75 no.30 And
when, in 1941, the two houses of the legislature could not
agree on the budget, they sent it to the governor for final
disposition. 1 Where there is no item veto, as in North Caro-
lina, Coleman B. Ransone, Jr. reports that "the legislature
seems to have developed some sense of responsibility; there
can be no buck-passing of undesirable legislation to the gov-
ernor with the knowledge that he will veto the bill in ques-
tion and thus take the burden from the legislature."3
The item veto does not qualify as an effective instrument
of spending control because it locks the doors of the treasury
after the spending bids have already been proposed. The
trick is to prevent the presentation of excessive expenditure
demands, not to engage in the futile task of rejecting a small
proportion after they have been made. Prevention is prefera-
ble to cure. This is not unique to budgeting, for the same is
true of crime and of health.
Just as criminals must be deterred before crimes are
committed, spending agencies must be persuaded to limit
their demands at the source. When the doctrine of the bal-
27. Morey, The Executive Veto in Arizona: Its Use and Limitations, 19 W.
POL. Q. 512 (1966).
28. Id. at 515.
29. McGeary, The Governor's Veto in Pennsylvania, 41 AM. POL. Sci. 943
(1947).
30. Id. at 945-46.
31. Id.
32. C. RANSONE, JR., THE AMERICAN GOVERNORSHIP 159 (1982).
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anced budget was in vogue, for instance, so that existing
levels of taxation, plus or minus an increment, provided a
global total beyond which spending would not be permitted
to go, the spending departments were enmeshed in mutual
understandings. If one department went beyond its fair share
of allowable increases, others would have to make up the dif-
ference. Thus all had an interest in keeping each within
bounds. No longer. Once participants in the budgetary pro-
cess believe that it is desirable to ask for more or that end
runs around the process (loans, guarantees, entitlements, reg-
ulations) pay off, the game is lost. No central controller has
the time to examine so many programs or has the capacity to
understand them. Where information is a prerequisite of con-
trol, the numerous people on the ground are bound to pre-
vail over the few who are far away.3
Where the desire exists to keep public spending from
growing faster than the economy but is prevented from mani-
festing itself due to an institutional bias (as may be true in the
United States), controlling expenditure through global
spending limits has merit. Where governments spend increas-
ing proportions.of GNP because that is what their elites and
their citizens want, they will not fix spending because they
believe it is not broken. Under such conditions, the item veto
is irrelevant because the idea is to include expenditures, not
exclude them.
Why, then, take a chance on a spending limit, which, be-
cause it is more powerful, is even less likely to become public
policy than the item veto? My concern about the veto is that
congressmen, tired of taking the heat for spending, may take
this opportunity to pass it on to presidents, with the unfortu-
nate consequences described here. I recommend the institu-
tion of a spending limit because, once enacted, it could do
the job for which it is advertised, namely, stop government
from growing faster than the economy. In the end, it all boils
down to this: a spending limit is aimed at reconciling desire
for lower totals with support for programs; by changing the
rules to bring the parts into a mutually supportive relation-
ship with the whole, global limits aim at the cause of higher
spending. The item veto does not.
33. See A. WILDAVSKY, The Transformation of Budgetary Norms, in THE
POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROcESS, XV (4th ed. 1983).
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III. THE ITEM VETO WITH A GLOBAL SPENDING LIMIT
Without a global spending limit, I have argued, a line-
item veto would be both weak and perverse. It would be
weak because the veto would apply only to a small proportion
of the budget that is either already under severe attack, like
general government, or has so far proved politically invulner-
able, like social security. It would be perverse because pro-
expenditure presidents could use the veto (or, more accu-
rately, the threat of the veto) to increase total spending, and
because legislators could (and some would) use the existence
of a veto to increase spending bids since presidents could al-
ways veto them if they were unsound. Thus a measure
designed to reduce spending and increase responsibility for
budgetary totals would likely have exactly the opposite ef-
fects: increasing irresponsibility as well as the size of the
budget.
Consider, however, how a line item veto might work in
the presence, rather than the absence, of a global spending
limit. Let us suppose that by congressional or constitutional
action, budget outlays for any year could not exceed the
prior year's totals times the percentage increase in GNP. Ev-
eryone would know that for a specific year, spending could
not exceed a given sum. Let us suppose, further, that the
usual incentives operated to push spending up to this global
limit. No doubt, such a situation would reduce the demand
for an item veto because the end in view, i.e., control over
spending, had been achieved by far more stringent and effec-
tive means. Nevertheless, it will be instructive to consider
how the veto would work under these much altered
circumstances.
Presidents so disposed could not use the threat of veto-
ing an item desired by many in Congress simply to increase
an item the executive preferred. If more for one item means
less for another (recall that everyone is operating at the mar-
gin of the global limit), presidents would have to accompany
substantial increases with substantial cuts. The budget could
go down but not up.
Nor would congressional spenders be disposed to pad old
items or throw in new ones on the supposition that presidents
would be responsible for vetoing them. Under the new rules
imposed by a global spending limit, Congress could not ex-
ceed the global total. Congress itself would have to cut some
items to make up for increases in others. This is what I un-
derstand as taking responsibility for the consequences of
19851
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one's own actions. If Congress proposed a budget exceeding
the limit, presidents could use their veto to cut at will, a pro-
cess that would put Congress in the weakest possible position.
With a limit in place, therefore, the item veto would be
restricted to two uses: (1) reducing the size of the budget be-
low the global total, or (2) enhancing the bargaining power
of presidents vis-a-vis a majority of Congress on which items
should be included in the budget at what level. Assuming
that presidents, over a range of vetoes, have reasonable pros-
pects of support from a little over one-third of the House or
Senate to prevent any two-thirds override of the veto, they
can eliminate (or, in prior bargaining, reduce the amount of)
spending items in dispute. Perhaps the threat of a veto would
sufficiently enhance items presidents prefer marginally over
those desired by an ordinary majority of Congress. Perhaps
Congress, mindful of being at a disadvantage, would word
items to make them difficult to veto. In any event, we see that
under a global limit the item veto would actually work in the
ways its sponsors desire by sometimes decreasing but never
increasing the size of the budget and by giving presidents
greater power to make marginal adjustments in the budget.
Whether their spending preferences would, on balance, be
furthered by presidents or Congresses is up to each reader to
decide.
The key to controlling spending, if that is what is de-
sired, lies in a global spending limit, not in a line-item veto.
Without a global limit, the item veto would likely boome-
rang, leading to greater political irresponsibility and higher
spending. With global limit, the item veto might lead to mar-
ginal decreases in spending and achieve the purpose for
which it was proposed.
[Vol. I
